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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
A. RULON JACKSON, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
GHANT R. CALDWELL, LEON 
H. JACKSON, LOYD J. 
CAMPBELL AND LOWELL 
D. NIELSON, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
Case No. 
10389 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This is an action by the plaintiff against the 
<lefendants, all of whom were former partners of 
a parLnership known as Messina, Jackson, Caldwell 
& Company, which proceeded upon plaintiff's amend-
ed complaint, defendants' answer thereto, defend-
a11ts' amended counterclaim and plaintiff's reply, 
<111 involving relief sought by the respective parties 
in connection with the existence of said partner-
i-:hip, the termination thereof on March 31, 1962, 
and the final accountings between the parties inci-
dC'nt to the completion of all the business and af-
fairs of said partnership. 
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DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The ~ase was tried to the Court. From a judg. 
ment holdmg, among other things, that the partner-
ship of Messina, Jackson, Caldwell & Company 
legally and lawfully terminated as to all partie·~ 
on March 31, 1962, pursuant to written notict 
dated April 3, 1961, given to plaintiff by defend-
ants and pursuant to the terms and conditions of 
the partnership agreement of April 1, 1958, amend-
ed as of April 1, 1959; that there was no duty upon 
either plaintiff or defendants to account under those 
certain agreements made and executed by the plain-
tiff and defendants dated March 7, 1960, and April 
21, 1960; that a proper, fair and equitable division 
of the assets of the terminated partnership of Mes-
sina, Jackson, Caldwell & Company was effectu-
ated and completed between plaintiff and defend-
ants as of March 30, 1962; that there was no con-
tinuity in the old terminated partnership as a busi-
ness entity in any respects by either plaintiff or 
defendants after March 31, 1962, the date of term· 
ination thereof, and there was no duty upon either 
plaintiff or defendants to preserve the old part-
nership, or any part or portion thereof, subsequent 
to March 31, 1962; that under the facts and cir· 
cumstances of this action, there was no intangiblr 
asset of the old terminated partnership in the form 
of good will for which the defendants are in any 
manner responsible for or accountable to plaintiff. 
or for which plaintiff is entitled to any compensa-
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tion; that defendant, Grant R. Caldwell, has prop-
l'rly, lawfully and timely accounted to plaintiff with 
resped to the work in process and other minor 
unfinished business of the terminated partnership 
and has deposited the funds determined to be due 
and owing to plaintiff pursuant to said accounting 
in a trust fund; that the division of the work in 
prrn.:ess of the old partnership as of March 31, 1962, 
on an individual client basis as shown and set forth 
in Exhibit D-32, is proper, fair and equitable; that 
plaintiff is chargeable to the old partnership for its 
investment in the work in process prior to March 
81, 1962, on accounts that went from the old term-
inated partnership to plaintiff's firm of Jackson, 
Maxwell & Company and he must account to defend-
ants therefore; that there was no conspiracy of any 
kind or nature on the part of the defendants to de-
prive plaintiff of his interest in the partnership 
of Messina, Jackson, Caldwell & Company; that 
defendants, or one or more of them, did not in any 
manner commit any tortious or unlawful acts 
against plaintiff or breach any fiduciary obliga-
tions or duties owed to him; that defendants, or any 
of them, did not violate or breach any agreement, 
en· agreements, with plaintiff, or at any time neglect 
or fail to cooperatively carry on the partnership 
priol' to March 31, 1962; that plaintiff's interest 
in the partnership is fully set forth in said partner-
ship agreement of April 1, 1958, amended as of 
.\pril 1, 1959, that there was no expulsion, tortious 
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01· otherwise, of plaintiff fi·om said partnership, 111 
any partnership; that there is no evidence that pbi11. 
tiff became disabled on Ap1·il 1, 1962; that tlh 
final consummation of the affafrs of the old pan-
nership be uncle1taken and completed by plaintiff 
and defendants in accordance with the partner-
ship agreement of April 1, 1958, amended as oJ 
Ap1·il 1, 1959; that plaintiff failed to meet thr pre-
ponde1·ance of evidence to sustain any of his cause~ 
of action; that there was no evidence to sustain 
defendants amended counte1·claim; and that no in-
terest be allowed on any amounts determined tri 
be owing fi·om defendants to plaintiff, or from 
plaintiff to defendants, 01· from plaintiff ancl clc-
fendants to the estate of Marco Messina, deceased. 
Plaintiff appealed. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff, Appellant, states that he seeks re-
versal of the judgment in certain respects and for 
appropriate orders as follows, to-wit: 
A. Determining that the defendants apprnvri-
a ted the bulk of the clients of the firm of 
Messina, Jackson, Caldwell, & Company 
during the term of the partnership ancl 
that defendants converted a valuable asset 
of the firm, to-wit: the good will of tlw 
firm, in relevant respects, to the exclusi(lll 
of plaintiff. 
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H. That the plaintiff, appellant, is entitled 
to an accounting for the value of the good 
will inherent in the client-accountant re-
lationship with respect to all of the clients 
of said firm. 
C. That plaintiff is entitled to certain adjust-
ments in the allocation of work in process 
of the firm of Messina, Jackson, Caldwell 
& Company, as of March 31, 1962. 
D. Alte1·natively, plaintiff is entitled to dam-
ages in accordance with the provisions of 
a partnership agreement between the par-
ties dated March 7, 1960. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Defendants controvert plaintiff's Statement of 
Facts as substantially excluding material and rele-
cant evidence; as being inconsistent with the facts; 
and that unti·ue and unfair inferences are presented 
thereby. Defendants submit their Statement of 
F:icts as follows: 
Prim· to the commencement of this action, 
plaintiff, defendants and Marco Messina, now de-
(·rased, were engaged in business in a partnership 
as public accountants, the name of which was Mes-
sina, Jackson, Caldwell & Company. The last part-
np1·ship agreement entered into by the parties to 
1 his ::iction and said Marco Messina, was elated 
.\pril 1, 1958, amended as of April 1, 1959. (Ex-
!111Jit P-4). 
5 
Sai~ partne1~ship agreement provided, among 
other thmgs and m relevant part, that in the event 
of the death of said Marco Messina, plaintiff, A. 
Rulon Jackson, or defendant, Grant R. Caldwell 
the partnership should nonetheless continue until 
the close of the second fiscal year after the fisral 
year in which such death occurred, (March 31 
I 
1962), and that the estate o rheirs of the decedent 
shall be entitled to the same participation between 
the date of death and the effective date of termin-
ation of the partnership as the decedent would have 
received had he continued to live and participate 
in the partnership (Art. IX, page 7, of Exhibit P-4). 
The said partnership conducted business on a fis. 
cal year basis commencing April 1, through March 
31, of the following year. Said Marco Messina died 
on August 16, 1959. 
After the death of said Marco Messina, plain-
tiff and defendants continued to operate the part-
nership under the name of 1\/Iessina, Jackson, Cald-
well & Company, pursuant to the terms and condi· 
tions of said partnership agreement of April 1. 
1958, amended as of April 1, 1959, until the e~rl 
of the second fiscal year after the fiscal year in 
which the death of Mr. Messina occurred, or until 
March 31, 1962, at which date the partnership ter~11· 
inated as to all parties pursuant to written notice 
dated April 3, 1961, duly given to plaintiff by de· 
fendants (Exhibit P-11), and pursuant to the terms 
and conditions of said partnership agreement. 
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In March, 1960, plaintiff and defendants ex-
rcnted aYi agreement which was received in evi-
dence as Exhibit P-5. This particular agreement 
recited that the parties recognized their obligations 
to the Messina Estate under the last partnership 
:,greernent entered into by plaintiff and defendants 
and Marco Messina dated April 1, 1958, amended 
as of April 1, 1959 (Exhibit P-4). Said agreement 
of March 7, 1960, provided for reinstatement of 
certain provisions relating to permanent disability 
which were contained in the 1958 agreement (Ex-
hibit P-3) but which were removed in their entirety 
from the 1959 agreement (Exhibit P-4) executed 
by all of the parties and in effect at the time of 
J\fr. Messina's death and also in effect, with no 
modification in this regard, as of March 31, 1962. 
Subsequent to the death of Mr. Messina, dis-
contentment arose among the partners and employ-
ees regarding management and other matters. Be-
ginning about January 1961, conferences and meet-
ing were held in an effort to seek some solution to 
the problems. Nothing constructive was accomplish-
ed (R. 411 to 418 inclusive). During the meetings 
ancl discussions, and at later meetings and discus-
sions, plaintiff was repeatedly advised by Mr. Cald-
well that with respect to the partnership he could 
have any account in the office; that he could have 
any employee; and that he could have the office 
:>pace then under lease (R. 330, 420, 422). Plain-
liff rejected these offers and continued to devote 
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substantially all of his time to his own person l 
business matters, as he had for several past year: 
and commencing about January, 1961, gradual]\'. 
withdrew from active partnership participation (R. 
252, 253, 414 & 415). The situation at this time 
as explained by Mr. Caldwell was one of complete 
dissention and impossibilty. (R. 411 & 412) Further 
discussions were had as to a possible purchase of 
plaintiff's interest in the partnership, but he re-
jected these offers. 
Defendants finally gave plaintiff formal writ-
ten notice of the termination of the partnership a~ 
of March 31, 1962, by instrument dated April 3, 
1951,and received in evidence as Exhibit P-11. 
Following receipt of said written notice dated 
April 3, 1961, plaintiff and defendant, Grant R. 
Caldwell, agreed that upon the termination of the 
partnership on March 31, 1962, the clients and ac-
counts were to be allowed to follow the accountants 
of their choice; that no solicitation of clients or ac-
counts would be made by any party; and that the 
situation would remain in the status quo until 
March 31, 1962. (R. 422 and 423). No solicitati011 
of any clients or accounts was made by defendants, 
or any of them, at any time. ( R. 254, 422 and 423). 
Mr. Paul J. Maxwell was an employee of the 
old partnership. Plaintiff formed a business rela-
tionship with Mr. Maxwell during the first part 
of January, 1962, some three months prior to tbi 
t('l 111ination. (R 447). Immediately thereafter, Mr. 
;\la:-;well terminated his employment wit hthe old 
partnership, took certain clients and accounts and 
1hPil' files and records with him, and opened offices 
in tht> Judge Building, Salt Lake City, Utah. (R 
·~;)4, 255, 421, 422). Notwithstanding the under-
::;Urnding of the parties with respect to solicitation 
of clients and accounts, plaintiff and his wife com-
menced to solicit and continued to solicit clients 
:rnd accounts of the old partnership to be serviced 
by Mr. Maxwell. (R 312 to 316, inclusive). Plain-
tiff and Mr. Maxwell formalized their business re-
btionship into a formal partnership to function as 
a public accounting organization during the month 
of May, 1962. ( R 453). 
Immediately upon the termination of the old 
partnership on March 31, 1962, plaintiff and de-
frnclant, Grant R. Caldwell, met and agreed upon 
a division of the assets of the said partnership. The 
cli\'ision was made as of March 31, 1962, and was 
approved by the other defendants. (Exhibit D-38) 
(R. ,109, 410, 411). Plaintiff immediately thereafter 
l'emoved all of those items selected by him, includ-
ing the files and working papers of those clients and 
accounts of the old partnership who chose to go with 
him and not theretofore taken by plaintiff or Mr. 
Maxwell, from the offices of the old partnership 
in said First Security Building to plaintiff's offices 
in the Judge Building where he continued the busi-
ness relationship theretofore fo1·rnecl with said Paul 
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J. Maxwell to service such clients and accounts as 
Jackson, Maxwell & Company, public accountants 
At the time of the division, plaintiff did not 
mention or make any reference to any breach of anv 
contract, did not assert that he was permanent!~ 
disabled, or make any demands upon defendant's 
of any kind or nature but the matter of immediate 
concern was to divide the assets to enable plaintiff 
to pursue his business relationship with Ml'. Max. 
well formed in January, 1962, to service those cli-
ents and accounts who chose to go with the mrather 
than remain with defendants, one of whom is plain-
tiff's brother (R. 423). Plaintiff's wife testified 
that she hoped plaintiff could re-establish himself 
in the accounting business at this time. (R 315). 
Defendants, certain of the employees and Mr. 
Nicholas Rhodes, a former individual practitioner, 
immediately formed a new business relationship , 
to service those clients and accounts of the old part-
nership who chose to go with them rather than with 
plaintiff and Mr. Maxwell. 
Certain work in process remained unfinished 
as of March 31, 1962, with respect to certain cli-
ents and accounts who chose to go with defendants 
rather than with plaintiff's new firm of .Jackson, 
Maxwell & Company. Defendants thereafter co1:1• 
pleted said work in process and prepared and mail· 
ed billings therefor. Defendant, Grant R. Caldwell, 
thereafter prepared a detailed accounting with re· 
10 
:,pPd to the work in process on an individual client-
account basis setting forth therein the division of 
the work in process between plaintiff, defendants 
and the estate of Marco Messina, deceased. The ori-
ginal accounting covering the division of the work 
in process was received in evidence as Exhibit P-14. 
Although plaintiff was requested on many occa-
sions to make suggestions as to the procedure he 
felt should be followed in making a division of the 
work in process and other minor unfinished busi-
ness, he declined and ref used to do so. 
As soon as the work in process matter was 
completed, defendant, Grant R. Caldwell, immedi-
ately thereafter prepared a detailed accounting with 
respect to the work in process based upon said 
Exhibit P-14, and with respect to all of the other 
minor unfinished business as of March 31, 1962, 
and furnished said accounting to plaintiff. (Ex-
hibit P-15). The funds determined to be due and 
owing to plaintiff pursuant to said accounting were 
deposited in a trust fund at that time by defendant, 
Grant R. Caldwell, and have remained in such ac-
count ever since ( R. 256 and 257) pending receipt 
of an accounting from plaintiff with respect to the 
work in process on those clients and accounts who 
chose to go with plaintiff in order that all pending 
matters, including the accountings, could finally be 
consummated. 
It was necessary for defendants to continue to 
utilize the accounts receivable ledger of the old 
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firm until a time when the work in process as of 
March 31, 1962, could be completed and billed and 
accountings to plaintiff and the Messina Estate 
properly prepared therefrom. To have done othe!'-
wise would have resulted in an unnecessary dupli-
cation of work by reason of the Messina Estate also 
being entitled to an accounting with respect to the 
work in process as of March 31, 1962, based upon 
billings for the first three months next succeeding 
March 31, 1962. (R. 256, 257, Exhibit P-4). 
Concurrently with the furnishing to plaintiff 
of said accounting last referred to above, defendant, 
Grant R. Caldwell, requested therein that plaintiff 
furnish him with an accounting with respect to those 
accounts who chose to go with plaintiff's new firm 
of Jackson, Maxwell & Company in order that the 
final accounting among plaintiff, defendants and 
the estate of Marco Messina, deceased, could be 
consummated. Plaintiff failed and refused to fur-
nish any such accounting. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE PREPONDER-
ATES THAT UNDER THE FACTS AND CIBCU~ 
STANCES OF THIS CASE THERE WAS NO INTAliG- , 
IBLE ASSET OF THE OLD TERMINATED PARTNER-
SHIP OF MESSINA, JACKSON, CALDWELL & COM· 
PANY IN THE FORM OF GOOD WILL FOR WHICH 
THE DEFENDANTS ARE RESPONSIBLE FOR OR AC-
COUNTABLE TO PLAINTIFF ... 
·11 A. The status of the law in regard to good wi 
as an asset as a professional partnership. 
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Defendants have not been able to find any case 
involving the general application of the principle 
which has been presented to the Supreme Court of 
the State of Utah and therefore the matter appears 
to be an open question in this state. 
The substantial weight of authority in this 
country is to the effect that no value can be at-
tached to the good will of a professional partnership, 
although there are some cases to the contrary based 
upon particular facts and circumstances. 
40 Am. Jur., Partnership, Section 271, page 
316, states as follows: 
"'Professional Partnerships.-
" The general rule is that a professional 
partnership the reputation of which depends 
on the individual skill of the members, such 
as partnerships of attorneys or physicians, 
has no goo dwill to be distributed as a firm 
asset on its dissolution." 
An annotation on the subject found at 44 
A.L.R. 524, states as follows: 
"III. Professional partnerships, or the 
like. 
"The general rule is that a professional 
partnership the reputation of which depends 
on the individual skill of the members, such 
as partnerships of attorneys or physicians, 
has no good will to be distributed as a firm 
asset on its dissolution. Witkowsky v. Affeld 
( 1918) 283 Ill. 557, 119 N.E. 630; McCall 
v. Moshocowitz ( 1886) 10 N.Y. Civ. Proc. 
13 
Rep. 107; Masters v. Brooks ( 1909) 13'> A . 
Div. 874, 117 N.Y. Supp. 585 · H~lden; fj;' 1!,a~in ( 184 7) 1 Pars. Sel. Eq. Cas. (Pa.; 
2 ~ 0, Slack v. Suddoth ( 1899) 102 Tenn. 37.i 
4n L.R.A. 589, 73 Am. St. Rep. 881 52 01\·· 
180;***." '''·1 · 
A later annotation on the subject found at 6~ 
A.L.R. 529, states as follows: -
. "5. Where good will is personal to indi-
vidual partner or attached to his incli\ idual 
property. 
"It is sometimes found, especially with 
respect to professional partnerships, that the 
good will of the business is primarily attached 
to the persons of the individual partners and 
necessarily attends each partner's personality 
upon a dissolution, so that there is no separ- 1 
ate 'partnership good will' which can be ac-
counted for. 
"The general rule is that a professional 
partnership, the reputation of which depends 
on the individual skill of the members, such 
as partnership of attorneys or physici~ns, 
has no good will to be distributed as a fmn 
asset on dissolution, said the court in Cool; L'8. 
Lauten (1954) 1 Ill. App. 2d 255, 117 N.~. 
2d 414, holding that a partnership of certi· 
1 
fied public accountants came under thr same 
rule, the court saying that this was e.spec1-
ally so where there was no provision rn _th,~ 
partnership agreement relating to good w1//. 
B. The Partnership Agreement. 
Plaintiff, while overlooking entirely the ~a~t ' 
that the pertinent partnership agreement ( Exhibii 
14 
P-0 itself does not list "good will" among the 
a:::sets uf the partnership, attempts by a rather 
tortuous chain of reasoning to equate the amount 
paid by the partnership to the Estate of Marco 
Messina \vith a valuation of the partnership good 
will. In fact, plaintiff takes the position that the 
entire compensation paid to Mr. Messina after he 
died was in recognition of the fact that he had 
brought to the firm accounts which in themselves 
had value. This argument, of course, overlooks en-
til'eley the clear picture made by the evidence in 
this case of the role of Mr. Messina in the firm 
before his death. Mr. Messina was the managing 
partner. ( R. 220) He directed the work of the other 
partners and of the employees of the firm. He main-
tained the contacts with the clients for the purpose 
of assuring that the work was performed satisfac-
torily. ( R. 220) Mr. Messina was no free-loader 
resting upon the fact that he had brought clients 
into the firm. He was in all respects a contribut-
ing, wm·king, active partner. Certainly, it would 
be folly to say that in a corporation management 
contributed nothing to the operation except the pos-
session of good will. Why then should such an argu-
ment be made in regard to a managing partner? 
Furthermore, the provision in the last partnership 
agreement executed by the parties and Mr. Messina 
1·egarding the participation of Mr. Messina's estate 
in the partnership profits for the pertinent period 
i1wolved has absolutely nothing to do with the valu-
15 
ation of any intangible (Exhibit P-4). It must 
be conceded that this is quite a common provision 
in partnership contracts and in employment con-
tracts of business organizations other than partner-
ships. It is not a valuation of good will, but simply 
a death benefit which is part of present compens~­
tion and which is spoken of in the language of in-
dustry as "fringe benefits." 
The partnership agreement in effect at the 
time of the termination of the partnership (Exhibit 
P-4) as well as the next preceding partnership 
agreement (Exhibit P-3) lists the capital assets of 
the firm. No mention is made of good will. The 
items listed are as follows: 
Cash in Banks 
Accounts receivable 
Work in process 
Notes and other receivables 
Furniture, fixtures and equipment 
(net after depreciation) 
Deposit with airline 
Investments (stocks) 
It is also to be noted that in all of the partner-
ship agreements in evidence the parties and ML 
Messina specifically excluded good will as an asset 
in computing the book value of a deceased partn:r:s 
capital account. (Exhibit P-1, Art. VIII; Exhibit 
P-2 Art. X; Exhibit P-3, Art. X; Exhibit P-4, Art. 
IX)' All of these agreements, except Exhibit P-4, 
were prepared by plaintiff who was and is a mem-
ber of the Utah State Bar. (R. 227). 
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40 Am. J ur.; Partnership, Sec. 270, page 315, 
st8 tes as follows : 
"Good will. Upon the dissolution of a co-
partnership, nothing being agreed as to the 
disposition of the good will of the business, 
it remains the property of the individual 
members of the firm. If each thereafter con-
tinues to pursue the same business, each may 
lawfully make such use of it as will best sub-
serve his several interests." 
40 Arn. Jur., Partnership, Section 270, citing 
authorities, further provides as follows: 
"Of course in particular instances it may 
appear that the good will of the firm is with-
out value. Where this is shown to be the case 
there is no necessity for accounting for it. 
Furthermore, the partners may contract that 
the good will of the firm is not to be consider-
ed as an asset in winding up its affairs, or 
that, on the withdrawal of a member, it is 
to go to the remaining members without any 
accounting for it. An agreement to this ef-
fect, express or implied, will be enforced. And 
when, on the dissolution of a partnership, the 
former members separate and no one appro-
priates the good will of the firm, there need 
be no accounting for this item." 
Nor does the Uniform Partnership Act contain 
any indication that a valuation shall be assigned 
lo good will upon dissolution. Sec. 48-1-37, U.C.A., 
1953 provides in part as follows: 
"In settling accounts between the part-
ners after dissolution, the following rules 
17 
shall be observed, subject to any agree-
ment to the contrary: 
( 1) The assets of the partnership are: 
(a) The partnership property. 
(b) The contributions of the part-
ners necessary for the p:w-
men t of all the liabilities 
specified in subdivision (2) 
of this section . . . " 
In the case of Cook v. Lauten, supra, the Comt 
held that a professional partnership, upon its dis-
solution, had no good will to be accounted for as an 
asset in the absence of a provision in the partner-
ship agreement relating to good will as an asset. 
The following annotation is found at 65 A.L.R. 
2d 541 covering a situation where a partnership 
contract makes no provision for the valuation of 
good will: 
"A partnership agreement which pro-
vided that a surviving partner could purchase 
the interest of the decedent for its 'book 
value' was held in Succession of Jmisich 
( 1953) 224 La 325, 69 So 2d 361, to relien 
the surviving partner from any duty to ac-
count to the defendant's estate for the valLie 
of the good will of the business, which wa' 
not carried on the books of the company as 
an asset. 
"A provision in the articles. that upon 
dissolution the good will of the busn:ess sho~I~ 
not be considered a part of the capital effect. 
of the partnership, but that each p~rt.11~ 1 
should be at liberty to carry on a srnulc:i 
18 
business in his own or other name not simila1· 
to 01· identical with the name of the firm 
was given effect in O'Donnel v. McLoughli~ 
(1956) 386 Pa 187, 125 A2d 370, the court 
holding that in the circumstances it was im-
proper to order a sale of the business as a go-
ing concern, including its good will and the 
right to continue the use of the firm name, 
since while it might be conceded that the good 
will and firm name were valuable assets, their 
disposition was a proper subject of contract 
between the partners." 
"Where the deceased partner had con-
curred in the practice of not carrying good 
will as an asset on the partnership books and 
had agreed to a contract provision that upon 
the death of any of the partners the others 
might purchase his interest on the basis of 
the valuation of the assets from the books, 
it was held in Re Randall's Estate ( 1947) 
29 \i\Tash 2d 447, 188 P2d 71, that the surviv-
ing partners were entitled to enforce this 
agreement notwithstanding the fact that the 
good will might have been the most valuable 
asset of the business and as a result the dece-
dent's estate received only a small amount 
of his actual interest in the business." 
"And in a number of other cases the 
courts have given effect to partnership agree-
ments providing that good will should not be 
taken into account upon dissolution brought 
about by the death of one of the partners. See 
Minoff v. Margetts (1951) 14 NJ Super 30, 
81 A2d 369, certif den 7 NJ 584, 83 A2d 381; 
Sands v. Miner (1897) 16 App Div 347, 44 
NYS 894, affd 160 NY 693, 55 NE 1100, 
* * * " 
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The following annotation is found at 4 7 A.L.R. 
2d 1429, also covering a situation where a partner-
ship contract makes no provision for the valuation 
of good will : 
"As the meaning of 'book value' is gor-
erned by the terms of the contract, the term 
does not include good will where the partner-
ship agreement expressly eliminates it as an 
item to be considered in computing such value. 
Minoff v. Margetts ( 1951) 14 N.J. Super 30 
81 A2d 369, certif den 7 N.J. 584, 83 A2c\ 
381; Sands v. Miner ( 1897) 16 App Div 347, 
44 NYS 894, affd 160 NY 693, 55 NE 1100; 
Soechtig v. Amick ( 1955) 285 App Div 701. 
140 NYS2d 85. 
"Good will has been excluded as a com-
ponent item of book value also where there 
appeared to be no satisfactory basis for assign-
ing a value to it, or there was no showing that 
the partnership agreement contemplated that 
it should be included in computing book value. 
"Thus, the exclusion of good will as an 
item of value was held to have been proper in 
Re Witkind's Estate ( 1938) 167 Misc 885, 
4 NYS2d 933, under a partnership agreement 
providing for the valuation of the interest of 
a deceased partner as of the date of his death 
'from the books of the partnership', where 
there was no evidence indicating the existence 
of any good will of more than nominal value. 
"Under provision of a partnership ag~·ee­
ment giving the surviving partner the ng~t 
to buy the interest of a deceased partner 111 
the partnership business at its then ~~oh 
value, it was held in Succession of Juns1ch 
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( 195:)) 224 La 325, 69 So.2d 361, that the 
g' ,od will of the firm should not be included 
111 fixing the value of such interest where 
there was no good will account on the books 
an cl no value for good will was shown on the 
books." 
C. 1'/ie rvidence with respect to the value of good 
1cil1, if any. 
The plaintiff has completely failed to establish 
a market value of the good will, if any, represented 
by the dients and accounts served by Messina, Jack-
son, Caldwell & Company. The testimony of Donald 
J. Pickett, plaintiff's "expert witness," can only 
be summed up as that of a witness attempting to 
sustain a preconceived result. He endeavored to 
establish the good will of the partnership as being 
worth 100 per cent of the preceding years' annual 
gross fees after minor adjustment for non-recurring 
accounts. (R. 359) This, he stated, was the pre-
,·ailing price in this community for the good will of 
an accounting partnership. ( R. 348 and 349). Yet, 
he testified that he knew of only a few sales in the 
community, one of which he purchased himself on 
a retained billing basis ( R. 372) from B. Leland 
Tanner, who moved from Utah to California; an-
other involving a purchase from Nielson & Watts 
to Elwood & Barnes, the terms of which he only 
determined "generally"; another involving a pur-
r:hase by Nielson & Psarras from Mr. Soltis; and 
another involving a sale of the practice of Theron 
Keel to Mr. Kirkham. Mr. Pickett testified he bid on 
21 
the two sales and purchases last above refened to· 
that the lost the bids; and that all of these mattel's 
were taken into his considered expert opinion as tri 
the value of the accounts served by Messina, Jad. 
son, Caldwell & Company. (R. 352 to 356, inclu-
sive). 
With respect to his own earlier partnership ar-
rangement with Mr. Keith Barnett (R. 373), he 
also testified that upon dissolution of the pal'tner-
ship on June 15, 1964, (R. 375) that in splitting 
up each of them simply took the clients and accounts 
that he could ( R. 380) ; that the clients simply went 
where they wanted to go ( R. 379) ; and that insofai 
as the value of the accounts was concerned, neither 
he nor Mr. Barnett determined any such value on 
the basis of 100 per cent of any previous years' bill-
ings in their final settlernen t. ( R. 380). 
In order to test the credibility of Mr. Pickett'2 
judgment, defendants requested Mr. Psarras and 
Mr. Kirkham to testify regarding their respective 
purchases. Mr. Psarras testified that his arrange· 
ment with the Soltis estate was absolutely not on 
the basis of any gross fees for any period of exist· 
ence, but solely on the basis of retained business, 
being 30 per cent the first year, 25 per cent ~he 
second year, and 20 per cent the third, of the bill-
ings as collected. Mr. Psarras, who is also an ex-
perienced certified public accountant, testifi~d that 
no reasonable value of accounts could be fixed '. 11 
any prior years' billings and that the relationshi]J 
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bctvveen the accountant and his client is such that 
it is primarily contingent upon the services rendered 
by the individual to the client and the personal re-
lationship established by the individual to the client 
am1 once the practitioner is no longer there to serve 
the client, a new relationship exists. (R. 561 to 563, 
inclusive). 
Mr. Kirkham, President of L.D.S. Business Col-
lege and a partner in the firm of Cope, W angsgard 
& Kirkham, testified that Mr. Teel died in an air-
plane accident and that he personally purchased 
the Teel practice for $2,500.00, of which the sum 
of $1,250.00 was allocated to library, furniture and 
fixtures and the sum of $1,250.00 to the value of 
the business retained. With respect to the previous 
year's billings of Mr. Teel, he testified that he paid 
"ten cents on the dollar hoping to retain at least 
that much business." (R. 566, 567). Therefore, if 
any amount could conceivably be awarded for good 
will, the only realistic evidence as to local custom 
is this one isolated sale which establishes it at only 
10 pPr cent. Even with respect to this isolated sale, 
it is to be noted that by reason of Mr. Teel being 
deceased any possibility of competition for the ac-
counts was completely eliminated. 
It is also significant to note that Mr. Pickett 
apparently thought so little of his opinion of the 
\'alue of accounts, which he testified to be worth 
lOo per cent of the previous years' annual gross fees 
that he even failed to bid high enough to purchase 
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the Teel accounts which were sold for "ten cents 
th d 11 " d · · on e o ar ~n , as men boned above, by reason of 
~~· Teel bemg deceased, any possibility of compe. 
tit10n for the accounts was completely eliminat l ec. 
A proper standard for the value of accounts 
if any, would seem to be the amount a third parti'. 
purchaser would have been willing to pay therefo;. 
on March 31, 1962. Keeping in mind that the loyal-
ties of the accounts were attached to the twelve in-
dividuals, including plaintiff and Mr. Caldwell 
I 
working for the old firm, all of whom had to earn 
a living from the proceeds of the clients and all of 
whom were going to continue in the accounting 
business, it is submitted that the evidence confirms 
that no purchaser could have been found who was 
willing to pay any price for the business. 
It must be conceded that the opinion of an ex-
pert witness, such as Mr. Pickett, is dependent upon 
and is no stronger than the facts upon which it i8 
predicated. The opinion has no probative force un-
less the premises upon which it is based are true. 
A review of Mr. Pickett's testimony can only lead 
to the inescapable conclusion that the basis of his 
qualifications was defeated; the assumptions he 
made about prior transactions in the community 
were 90 per cent in error; he was shown to have 
an interest in the case which was anything but ob-
jective; and certain of the information ( Exhibi'.s 
P-21 and P-22) (R. 507) upon which he based his 
opm10n, as prepared by Karl Maxwell, was erron· 
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enn:s and incomplete. ( R. 495 to 503, inclusive). 
D. The facts and circumstances of this case pre-
clude any allowance for good will. 
ln addition to the fact that the parties have 
Rpecifically excluded good will as an asset of the 
old partnership in all of the partnership agreements 
(Exhibits P-1; P-2; P-3; P-4; and P-5), there is no 
case which has been referred to by the plaintiff 
which would support the award to the plaintiff 
for any amount at all for good will under the facts 
and circumstances in the subject case. The cases 
and authorities relied upon by the plaintiff are of 
little assistance in this case. The case of Halverson 
v. Walker ( 1910) 28 Utah 262, 112 P. 804, involves 
the good will in the sale of one-half interest in a 
b:trber shop; the case of Vercimak v. Ostoich ( 1950) 
118 Utah 253, 221 P. 2d 602, involves the good will 
of a beer parlor; the case of Miller v. Hall, 65 Cal. 
App. 2d 200, 150 P. 2d 287, which plaintiff states 
quoted with approval certain language fro mthe 
case of Hutchins v. Page, 204 Mass. 284, 90 NE 
565, 134 Am. St. Rep. 656, involves the good will 
of a brokerage firm dealing in stocks, bonds, and 
securities and the good will of a manufacturing 
business, respectively; the case of Ruppe v. Utter, 
76 Cal. App. 19, 243 P. 715, involves the good will 
of a general undertaking, embalming and funeral 
directing business; the case of Smith v. Bull, 325 
P. 2d 463, involves the good will of an advertising 
bn,,iness; and the case of Bergum v. Weber, 288 P. 
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~d 623, involves th: good will of a business engaged 
m the manufacturmg of loop and wire ties. 
The sole case relied on by plaintiff which actu. 
~lly involves the. g~neral application of the principal ' 
is the case of William J. Evans v. Frank A. Gmrni}J, 
135 A. 2d 128, 65 ALR 2d 513; ...... DeL __ ., 135 
A. 2d 134, 65 ALR 2d 520. The Evans v. Gunni}J 
case involved an accounting of partnership assets 
by a retired partner (Evans) against the rernaining-
partner ( Gunnip). The partnership was one of pub~ ! 
lie accountants and, upon Evans withdrawal, all of 
the assets of the partnership were transferred by 
Gunnip to a new partnership, Gunnip, Isaacson & 
Stolper, of which he was a member. It was prnved 
that in the partnership agreement between Gunnip, 
Isaacson & Stolper, the value of Gunnip's interest 
in the good will of the partnership was fixed at 
$100,000 with a proviso that Gunnip would receive 
75 per cent therof upon his withdrawal from the 
partnership. It was also shown that at the time 
Evans left, Gunnip agreed to shortly give Evans 
a statement of the financial condition of the part-
nership upon which the accounting was to be made. 
This was never done. While there appear to be 
superficial resemblances between the Evans v. Giin· 
nip case and the subject case, on the fundamental 
proposition upon which the matter turns, they are 
diametrically opposed. 
In both cases an accounting partnership is in-
volved. In both cases the partnership was termin-
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,1tecl because one partner did not desire to continue 
in association with the other partner. However, at 
this point any similarity ceases. In the subject case, 
the defendants informed plaintiff that they would 
not continue the partnership arrangement after 
March 31, 1962, but that no effort would be made 
by them to persuade any of the firm's clients and 
accounts to accompany them into their new associa-
tion. The evidence is to the effect that it was agreed 
that the clients and accounts of the firm could go 
wherever such clients and accounts desired without 
any pressure being exerted, and indeed the evidence 
is to the effect that no pressure was exerted by the 
def end an ts ( R. 422 and 423). The sole and only 
action taken by Mr. Caldwell and his associates to 
inform clients and accounts regarding the new situ-
ation was a formal announcement of the formation 
of a new partnership. (Exhibit P-10). On the other 
hand, Mr. Jackson, principally through his wife, 
made efforts to solicit clients and accounts of the 
old partnership for his new partnership being form-
c{l at the time with Mr. Paul J. Maxwell (R. 312 
to 316, inclusive). Mr. Caldwell made every effort 
to advise a particular client whom he thought would 
want to go with Mr. Jackson of his new status and 
informing the client that he could come in and pick 
up the pertinent files, (Exhibit D-46). 
The significant part of the Evans v. Gunnip 
case is to be found in the fallowing language: 
"It may be true that Evans did not enter into 
27 
an. agree1~1ent not to _compete. However, the 
evidence is that he did endeavor with somr> 
succe~s to _pursuade t~ose clie!1ts. of the pai·t-
n_ersh1p with whom his association was par-
bc~larly close to remain wi~h the partnership. 
I~ is also ~fact ~hat he advised Gunnip at the 
~ime of dissolut10n that he was not intend. 
mg to compete and has not done so since that 
time." 
Therefore, Mr. Jackson, unlike Mr. Evans, did 
not refrain from competing; did not urge clients 
to stay with Mr. Caldwell and his associates; but 
has competed in all respects and has solicited the 
clients and accounts for his firm of Jackson, Max-
well & Company. Mr. Caldwell, on the other hand, 
unlike Mr. Gunnip, has properly and timely account-
ed to plaintiff, has not solicited and taken the en-
tirety of the clients of the former partnership, but 
refrained from solicitation pursuant to his agree-
ment with Mr. Jackson, and, in at least one casr, 
actively urged a client to go with Mr. Jackson and 
his new partner, Paul J. Maxwell. (Exhibit D-46). 
The plaintiff in his brief makes much of the 
fact that Mr. Jackson in the period following Mr. 
Messina's death became unable to render effectil'e 
service to clients and accounts, and therefore, so 
the plaintiff reasons, Mr. Caldwell took advantage 
of a situation feeling that Mr. Jackson would be 
unable to take any clients with him in spite of the 
fact that the clients and accounts were not to be 
solicited. In fact, plaintiff contends that Mr. Cald· 
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well calculatingly sat down and computed just what 
clients would continue to do business with Mr. Cald-
\Yrll, and his associates. This, of course, is not the 
p\'idence ( R. 246 to 249, inclusive). The evidence 
is clear that while during the period between the 
time Mr. Caldwell gave notice to Mr. Jackson on 
April 3, 1961, and the actual termination of the 
l)artnership on March 31, 1962, Mr. Caldwell occa-
1 
siunally discussed with his secretary where a par-
ticular account might go, no attempt was ever made 
to make a complete study or computation on this 
matter to determine how much in gross or how many 
clients Mr. Caldwell and his associates would keep 
and how much in gross or how many clients Mr. 
Jackson would keep. Furthermore, the evidence is 
clear that any appraisal made by Mr. Caldwell, or 
by his secretary, in this regard was as of ten as not 
in error. (R. 246, 247, 248, 249, 267). 
The most telling argument in this case against 
assigning any good will to the old partnership of 
Messina, Jackson, Caldwell & Co., is the undisputed 
fact that the accounts did not tend to go with either 
of the partners, but rather tended to follow the 
particular employee of said partnership that had 
been se1·ving that client or account. (R. 267). The 
fact that more of the clients and accounts ended up 
with the new firm of Caldwell, Nielson, Campbell 
& Co., then ended up with Jackson, Maxwell & Co., 
resulted from the fact that more of the employees 
:ind limited partners of the firm of Messina, Jack-
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son, Caldwell~ Co.,, who.had actually been doing thP 
work of the clients busmess, chose to go with Mr. 
Caldwell than chose to go with Mr. Jackson. Two 
of the individuals working directly on accounts, 
Paul J. Maxwell and Reed A. Beck, went with Mr. 
Jackson. On the other hand, nine of the individuals 
performing work on the clients' records, Lowell D. 
Nielson, Loyd J. Campbell, Melvin E. Hill, Jr., 
Charles H. Foote, Jr., Leon H. Jackson, Charles 
Lowe, James B. Ostler, Lenore Bateman, and Mr. 
Caldwell himself, ended up with the firm of Cald-
well, Nielson, Campbell & Company. It is quite 
natural and logical, therefore, that more of the busi-
ness ended up with Mr. Caldwell's new firm. It 
must also be recognized that a great many more 
people had to earn their living fro mthe proceeds 
of the clients that went with Mr. Caldwell than had 
to earn their living from the proceeds of the clients 
that went with Mr. Jackson, and these individuals 
that had to earn a living from the firm on the basis 
of actual hours expended were the particular indi-
viduals to whom the loyalties of the clients were 
attached ( R. 268 and 269). Only 22.2 % of the in-
come which came to the new firm (compared to 
27.5% of the income of the old firm) was paid to 
Mr. Caldwell, as is shown by Exhibit D-47. 
It is an undisputed fact that plaintiff took 
more clients and accounts with him in his new 
partnership with Mr. Maxwell than were ever iden-
tified with him at any time he was a partner of 
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Messina, Jackson, Caldwall & Company, one of 
which, State Line Hotel, Inc., was one of the largest 
accounts said Company had and was being serviced 
at the time by Reed Beck who also went with Mr. 
Jackson and Mr. Maxwell (Exhibit D-33) 
It is also an undisputed fact that in January 
1962, Paul J. Maxwell endeavored to employ cer-
tain of the secretaries away from the old firm to 
join him in his new venture with Mr. Jackson (R. 
614) and prior to March 31, 1962, received files 
and working papers of accounts to be serviced by 
Jackson, Maxwell & Company (Exhibit D-16). Ref-
erence is also made to receipts on letter head station-
ary of Jackson, Maxwell & Company, all of which 
refer to the old partnership as "the former firm of 
Messina, Jackson, Caldwell & Company" (Exhibit 
D-16) as additional evidence that the old firm had 
terminated in conformity with the intention and 
acts of the parties. 
Mr. Charles H. Foote, Jr., an employee of the 
old firm of Messina, Jackson, Caldwell & Company, 
also testified that had he not joined Mr. Caldwell's 
new firm of Caldwell, Nielson, Campbell & Com-
pany on April 1, 1962, but had gone elsewhere, he 
could also have taken with him certain of the ac-
cuunts of the old firm on which he had been work-
ing. (R. 592). 
Under these circumstances, it is extremely dif-
ficult to see how any a ward could be made in this 
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case for partnership good will because: (a) 110 at 
tempt was made to divide the clients, but it was 
agreed that each was to be allowed to go where he 
pleased without coercion, however, subtle; (b) tht~ 
attachment of the clients proved to be not to tlw 
firm, but rather to the individual employee of the 
firm who was doing the actual work on the client's 
books; and ( c) plaintiff continued on as an account-
ant and serving many of the clients. 
Defendants submit that the holding of the lower 
court must be affirmed. 
POINT II 
THE WORK IN PROCESS AS OF MARCH 31, 1%2, 
HAS BEEN PROPERLY DETERMINED BY THE 
TRIAL COURT AND FULLY ACCOUNTED FOR BY 
THE DEFENDANTS. 
Plaintiff contends that the Court erred in fail-
ing to require defendants to account to plaintiff for 
the value of work in process on March 31, 1962, based 
upon the proximate investment in such work in 
process prior to said date. It is the position of plain-
ti'ff that he is entitled to share in fees received 
from clients whose work was in process on March 
31, 1962, based upon the total proportionate invest-
ment made in the fee compared with the invest-
ment made in the fee after the effective termina-
tion date. Plaintiff states that the results obtained 
by defendants was accomplished by design rath~r 
than application of accounting theory. An anal~s1~ 
of the matter can only lead to the conclusion that 
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plaintiff's theories as to the allocation of work in 
process are erroneous. Plaintiff's theories in this 
regard were based upon Exhibit P-23 and the testi-
mony of Mr. Karl J. Maxwell with respect thereto 
1 R. 478 to 482, inclusive). 
It is not possible for defendants to cover this 
point in one or two paragraphs by simply apply-
ing percentage factors to totals, as in the case of 
plaintiff, but a review of the evidence is necessary 
in order to properly apprise the Court of the proper 
procedures followed. 
Said Exhibit P-14 is the original schedule pre-
pared under the direction of Defendant, Grant R. 
Caldwell, showing thereon the proper allocation of 
work in process with respect to each client as of 
March 31, 1962, as between the old firm of Messina, 
Jackson, Caldwell & Co., which terminated as of 
~Tarch 31, 1962, and Caldwell, Nielson, Campbell 
& Company. Some accounting work was performed 
by the old firm of Messina, Jackson, Caldwell & 
Company prior to March 31, 1962, as to certain 
clients, but which was completed after March 31, 
1962, by the firm of Caldwell, Nielson, Campbell & 
Company. 
The proper method of allocation of said work 
in process with respect to each client as between 
the two firms, and as in fully set forth and shown 
in said Exhibit P-14, may be summarized as fol-
lows: 
(a) Each firm first recovers actual travel ex-
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penses (hotel, meals, taxi, air tra .. 
1 etc.) from the total billings as show;c, 
columns 4 and 7 of said Exhibit P-14. 11J 
( b) The percentage ~f accountants' time 
charges for both. firms as to each client 
w~s then detern:med and the amount ap. 
phcable to Messma, Jackson, Caldwell & 
Company, was set forth in column 13 of 
said Exhibit P-14. 
( c) The respective percentages were then ap-
plied to the remainder of the billino 
(after deducting the travel expenses rr: 
ferred to in paragraph (a) above) f~r 
each client in order to determine each 
firm's fair and proper share of the fee 
earned, and the amount applicable tn 
Messina, J ac~son, Caldwell & Company, 
as to each client, was shown in column · 
14 of said Exhibit P-14. 
Plaintiff's examination of said Exhibit P-14, 
resulted in one objection only, and this was to the 
fact that certain of the partners' and employees' 
time charges were increased by the firm of Cald-
well, Nielson, Campbell & Company subsequent to 
March 31, 1962, and plaintiff contended that un-
less the fee billings were increased proportionately 
to the increase in accountants' and employees' time 
charges made subsequent to March 31, 1962, that 
the increased time charges, as reflected in sai<l Ex-
hibit P-14, would distort the allocation of the work 
in process in favor of said Caldwell, Nielson, Ca111p-
bell & Company ( R. 481 and 482) . 
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Defendants thereafter prepared Exhibit D-32, 
,rhich reflects a readjustment of the increased ac-
(nuntants' time charges used in said Exhibit P-14, 
Jiac:k to the lower rates charged prior to March 31, 
1'.1G2, so that all of the accountants' time charges 
utilized in both Exhibits P-14 and D-32, were on 
the same basis in all respects. The results of the 
rccomputation as shown in said Exhibit D-32, in-
dicates an additional sum of $1,105.72, in plaintiff's 
favor over and above the sum computed to be owing 
to plaintiff as set forth in Defendants' Accounting 
(Exhibit P-15) furnished to plaintiff in July of 
1963, which sum has been in a trust account for 
plaintiff since that time. However, the recomputa-
tion shown in said Exhibit D-32, does not take into 
account the increased fees resulting from the higher 
billing rates of said Caldwell, Nielson, Campbell & 
Company subsequent to March 31, 1962, which, 
when propel'ly applied to the computations, confirms 
defendants' original allocation of the work in pro-
cess as shown in said Exhibit P-14 (and as applied 
in paragraph ( c) above referred to) as being com-
pl?tely proper, fair and equitable. 
Defendants' said Exhibit D-32 corrected the 
one objection plaintiff made to said Exhibit P-14, 
and applied therein plaintiff's own theory as used 
in plamtiff's Exhibit P-23, but sets forth the actual 
cletci.ils with respect to each account on an individual 
il1sis rather than arbitrarily and erroneously apply-
. percentages to totals as Mr. Maxwell did in his 
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computations set forth in said Exhibit P-23. 
Plaintiff's said Exhibit P-23, reflecting plain. 
tiff's own theory of allocation of the WOl"k in pro-
cess, and now plaintiff's new computations under 
Point IV of his Brief, are erroneous, improper and 
misleading for the fallowing reasons: 
( 1) Travel expenses are given the same 
weight in Plaintiff's allocation of the 
work in process as the accountant's time 
charges. This procedure imposes in the 
computations an underlying theory that 
an accounting form is entitled to a "pro-
fit" on travel expenses which conflicts 
with all sound reasoning, proper account-
ing principles and economic justification. 
(2) Mr. Karl Maxwell included as a part of 
Plaintiff's Exhibit P-23 a schedule show-
ing the percentage increase in time 
charges between the hourly rates of the 
firm of Messina, Jackson, Caldwell & 
Company before March 31, 1962, and the 
firm of Caldwell, Nielson, Campbell & 
Company after March 31, 1962. How-
ever Mr. Maxwell completely failed and negl~cted to take into account in his com-
putations the time of certain of the ac-
countants for which there was no change 
in time rates either before or after March 
31, 1962, as follows: 
Mr. Leon H. Jackson 
Mr. Charles E. Lowe 
Mr. Ray Jensen 
Mr. Al Smith 
( 3) Mr. Kar 1 Maxwell also erroneously ap 
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(4) 
plied the percentage change in billing 
i·ates (as he arbitrarily and erroneously 
deten11ined it in Schedule B-1 of said 
Exhibit P-23) to total costs for all clients 
rather than to each client on an indi-
vidual basis. This procedure completely 
violates proper accounting principles and 
erroneously applies an averaging concept 
to the computations which should not 
and does not, apply when all of the de-
tails are available to make a proper and 
correct computation as is set forth in Ex-
hibit P-14 and Exhibit D-32. 
Mr. Karl Maxwell also erroneously ap-
plied the percentage relationship of costs 
for each firm to the billings in total rath-
er than to each individual client's billing. 
The error and inequity of this procedure 
may be illustrated as follows: 
The very first named client listed in 
Exhibits P-14 and D-32, is as fol-
lows: 
Client 
Edward Abrahams 
Time and 
Expense 
MJC&C 
(Columns 
3, 4, 5) 
None 
Fee 
(Column 9) 
$50.00 
Time and 
Expense 
CNC&C 
(Columns 
6, 7, 8) 
$55.00 (D-32) 
$66.00 (P-14) 
Mr. Karl Maxwell erroneously and 
improperly applied 54.344 % (as 
shown in his Exhibit P-23) to the 
above $50.00 billing and erroneous-
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ly and arbitrarily allocates the 
of $27.17, to the firm of Mess~urn 1 
J k c ld ll1:t ac son, a. well & Companv' 
whereas no time nor exr)enses 1 ~: b . . d b . lau een mcur~ e y that firm with re-
spect to this .account prior to Man.:h 
3~, 1962. This procedure complete!: 
v10lates ~roper accoun~ing principle~ 
and apph~s an averagmg concept to 
totals which should not, and does 
not, apply when all details are avail-
able to Il:!ake a proper and correct 
co~puta~10n on an individual client 
basis as is set forth in said Exhibit~ 
P-14 and D-32. 
It can readily be seen that the computations 1 
of Mr. Maxwell in Exhibit P-23, as well as those of 
plaintiff in his Brief, are erroneous and mislead-
ing under any theory. Mr. Maxwell's schedule show-
ing the percentage increase in time charges between 1 
the old firm before March 31, 1962, and the new 
firm after March 31, 1962, completely fails to take 
into account the time of four accountants for which 
there was no change in time rates either before or 
after March 31, 1962. His application of the per-
centage relationship of costs to the billings in total 
gives the old firm the sum of $27.17 with respect , 
to the Edward Abrahams account, and no time nor 
expense had been incurred b ythe old firm regard· 
ing this account prior to March 31, 1962. This type 
of inequity results from dealing in totals rather 
than on an individual client basis. 
The lower Court held that the division of the 
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11-ork in process of the old partnership as of March 
;~L 1 ~)62, on an individual client basis as shown 
and set forth in said Exhibit D-32, was proper, fair 
,1nrl equitable. Said Exhibit D-32, was also prepared 
to allow each firm to recover actual travel expenses 
from the total billings prior to the application of 
the determined percentages to the remainder of 
the billing in order to compute each firm's fair 
:me! proper share of the fee earned. However, it is 
to be remembered that the computation shown in 
said Exhibit D-32 does not take into account the 
increased fees resulting from the higher billing 
rates of the new firm subsequent to March 31, 1962, 
which, when applied to the computations as shown 
in Exhibit P-14, confirms defendants' original al-
lccation of the work in process as shown in said 
Exhibit P-14 as being reasonable, proper, fair and 
e11L\itable. 
1'he differences between the amounts due plain-
tiff for work in process as shown by said Exhibits 
P-11 and D-32 are not great and defendants re-
spectfully submit that the lower Court's ruling with 
respect to this matter should be affirmed in all 
respr·cts. 
POINT III 
'rHE AGREEMENT OF MARCH 7, 1960, WAS 
FULLY CONSIDERED BY THE TRIAL COURT AND 
FINDINGS MADE THAT NO ACCOUNTING WAS RE-
Ql'IFtED BY SAID AGREEMENT AND NO DAMAGES 
lfAVE ACCRUED AS NO BREACH THEREOF OC-
r'T'RRED. 
Plaintiff is completely erroneous in stating that 
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the trial court ref used to make any Findings of 
Fact or Conclusions of Law with respect to the isst. 
involved in this cause of action. The court proper;~ 
found in its Finding of Fact under paragraph 8, 
thereof, that the parties executed said agreement of 
March 7, 1960, (Exhibit P-5) as well as an agree-
ment dated April 21, 1961, (Exhibit D-35) but that 
there was no requirement upon the parties to ac- , 
count under said agreements, or any combination 
thereof ( R. 193 and 200). The court also found in 
its Finding of Fact under paragraph 24, thereof, 
that defendants did no violate or breach any agree-
ment, or agreements, with plaintiff, and further 
that there was no evidence that plaintiff became 
disabled on April 1, 1962. (R. 193). 
Plaintiff never requested the lower court to 
make any additional findings. Plaintiff requested 
defendants to stipulate that he could have additional 
time in which to object to the trial court's Findings 
and Judgment and such stipulation was executed 
and the trial court did enter its order granting 
plaintiff the requested additional time. (R. 207 and 
208). Plaintiff thereafter, and on his own Motion, 
had the court set aside said Stipulation and Order. 
(R. 211). 
Plaintiff's failure to object to trial court find-
ings is, of course, not a waiver of failure to find 
on a material issue, if such was actually the case, 
but is is submitted that such is not the case and 
the rule that findings must be liberally construed 
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in support of judgment is particularly applicable 
in absence of a request for more specific findings. 
Said agreement of March 7, 1960, (Exhibit 
P-3) provided that: 
"Effective April 1, 1962, amendments to 
the present partnership agrement are to be 
entered into incorporating in the document 
the agreement in 3 above, together with other 
conditions and agreements mutually accept-
able to the parties." 
It must be concluded that it was in some re-
spects nothing more than an agreement to negotiate 
and agree at some future time. It must also be con-
cluded that the parties could not legally modify said 
agreement of April 1, 1958, amended as of April 1, 
1969, the last partnership agreement entered into 
\rith Mr. Messina, and under which the parties 
oprrated up to March 31, 1962, without the consent 
and joinder of the Messina Estate thereto: 
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, Section 48-1-28, 
with respect to partnerships, provides: 
"Causes of dissolution. - Dissolution is 
caused: 
( 1) \Vithout violation of the agreement be-
tween the partners : 
(a) By the termination of the definite 
term or particular undertaking spe-
cified in the agreement. 
( b) By the express will of any partner 
when no definite term or particular 
undertaking is specified * * *" 
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. In addition to the fact that the agreement of 
April 1, 1958, amended as of April 1, 1959 (Exhil't 
P-4) provided for the termination of the paitn::.: 
ship on March 31, 1962, it must also be concedpc) 
that defendants gave plaintiff proper notice of the 
termination of the partnership by instrument datrrl 
April 3, 1961. (Exhibit P-11). Plaintiff was thete-
fore properly and lawfully notified that any part. 
nership relationship among the parties would term-
inate as of March 31, 1962. 
The significant part of the March 7, 1960, 
agreement is found in the following language: 
"In the event of the death or permanent 
disability of any of the parties hereto, this 
agreement shall become null and void insofar 
as the deceased or disabled party is concerned, 
and his partnership participation shall be in 
accordance with Articles VIII, IX and X of 
the partnership agreement of Messina, Jack-
son, Caldwell & Company dated April 1, 1058, ' 
amended as of April 1, 1959, * * *". 
It would appear that said agreement, if it in 1 
fact accomplished anything, simply reinstated the 
disability provision set forth in the agreement dnterl 
April 1, 1958, (Exhibit P-3) which was eliminated 
from the agreement dated April 1, 1958, amended 
as of April 1, 1959. (Exhibit P-4). Plaintiff ha\'ing 
been notified that the partnership relationship wou~cl 
terminate in all respects as of March 31, 1962, said 
agreement of March 7, 1960, only becomes signi- ' 
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fic:rnt if plaintiff become permanently disabled prior 
tu March :31, 1962. 
A composite of the pertinent part of Article IX 
of the agreement of April 1, 1958, amended as of 
.\pril 1, 1959, (Exhibit P-4) taking into account 
:he reinstatement of the disability provision re-
moved by the parties therefrom, is as follows: 
"Article IX. 
In the event of the death (or permanent 
disability) of Marco Messina, A. Rulon Jack-
son or Grant R. Caldwell, the estate or heirs 
of the decent shall be entitled to the same 
participation between the date of death (or 
permanent disability) and the effective date 
of termination of the partnership as provided 
in Article VI above as the decedent would 
have received had he continued to live and 
participate in the partnership." 
By reason of the partnership being on a fiscal 
year basis, if plaintiff became permanently disabled 
Letween August 16, 1959, the date of Mr. Messina's 
death, and March 7, 1960, he woul dhave been en-
titled to receive his percentage participation (27.5 
per cent) in the partnership profits for the fiscal 
year ending March 31, 1960, and for two full fiscal 
yrars thereafter, or until March 31, 1962, at which 
time his interest in the partnership would have 
terminated. It is undisputed that plaintiff has al-
ready received this amount. 
Plaintiff states in his brief that "some time 
beforr March 7, 1960, the date of the 1960 agree-
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ment, and March 31, 1962, plaintiff became total]\· , 
and ~ermanently disabled insofar as his ability t;
1 
funct10n as a public accountant was concel'ned" 
plaintiff contends that the evidence reasonably fix~s 
the date of this incapacity as the spring of 1961. 
I'f plaintiff became incapacitated in January 01 
1961, he would have been entitled to receive his per 
centage participation (27.5 per cent) in the part-
nership profits for the fiscal year ending March 31, 
1961, and for two full fiscal years thereafter m· 
' until March 31, 1963. It is undisputed that he re-
ceived his full share of partnership profits right 
up to March 31, 1962. 
Under the circumstances, it is just as logical 
and reasonable to assume that plaintiff became dis-
abled in March of 1960 as in January of 1961. Fur-
thermore, it is just as logical and reasonable to 
assume that plaintiff did not become disabled until 
after April 1, 1962, and before June of 1963, when 
he was first examined by Dr. Moench. Plaintiff's 
actions belie his permanent disability prior to April 
1, 1962. 
It is submitted that plaintiff completely failed : 
to sustain his burden of proof with respect to any i 
permanent disability prior to March 31, 1962, an~ 
the trial court properly held that there was no ev:· 
dence that plaintiff became disabled prior to April 
1 1962 and that none of the parties were under 
' ' any obligation to account under said agreement. 
In this respect, Dr. Moench testified that l1l' 
44 
e:-;amined M1·. Jackson on two occasions, July, 1963, 
;!lld December, 1963. ( R. 335). He further testified 
that his diagnosis of Mr. Jackson's illness was senile 
µsychotic reaction, presumably due to an aging pro-
cess so that the person eventually loses his usual 
contact with reality (R. 336) ; that it was impossible 
to pinpoint a time when this began and "it is in 
general a permanent and progressive condition" 
(R. 336) ; and that based upon his first examination 
of Mr. Jackson in July of 1963, he "couldn't tell 
whether he was incompetent or not in January of 
1961" and that he had no way of knowing whether 
he (Mr. Jackson) was disabled a year prior to the 
date he first saw him. (R. 342). Dr. Moench also 
testified that there was no way of telling how long 
Mr. Jackson's illness had been in progress. (R. 341). 
Mrs. Jackson attempted to pinpoint January of 
1961 as the beginning date of Mr. Jackson's illness 
( R 307). She testified that he was struck by a car 
as a pedestrian and carried some 15 or 20 feet in 
.July of 1963 (R. 310); that as of January 1961, 
he wasn't right up to par, but that she didn't think 
he was totally disabled (R. 311); that she felt he 
became disabled on March 13, 1961 (R. 311); and 
she also testified that she could not give a date when 
Mr. Jackson became disabled and on April 1, 1962, 
she helped set up an accounting practice for him. 
(R. 312). Mrs. Jackson also testified that as late 
as the date of trial of this case on December 1, 1964, 
.. ~ ' * he (Mr. Jackson) leaves to go down to the 
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office in the morning about eight or eight-thirty 
and he comes back home about one or one-thirtr 
* * * " clearly indicating that approximately tw~1 
and one-half years after March 31, 1962, he was 
still going to his office each day. ( R. 304). 
Mr. F. H. Carlton, one of plaintiff's witnesses, 
testified that he couldn't say Mr. Jackson was in-
competent on April 1, 1962, and that he should haw 
been able to carry on an accounting practice as 
of that date. (R. 303). Paul J. Maxwell apparently 
had no misgivings about forming a business l'ela". 
tionship with Mr. Jackson in January, 1962. 
Apparently Mr. Roy W. Simmons, President of 
Keystone Insurance & Investment Co., did not feel 
that plaintiff was permanently disabled when he re-
quested Mr. Caldwell to release to Mr. Jackson 
"all of my personal files, Adams & Sons Company 
files, and Keystone files", by letter directed to Mr. 
Caldwell dated April 9, 1962 (Exhibit D-16). Re-
ference is also made to the many receipts for files, 
working papers, etc., executed by Mr. Jackson sub-
sequent to April 1, 1962, one of which was dated 
November 16, 1962 (Exhibit D-16), in comparisun 
to Mrs. Jackson's testimony that he could not write 
his name in October 1961 (R. 305) and could nnt 
write his name on a check in January 19Gl (R 
407). 
At the trial, and even though defendants con· 
tended and the trial court subsequently held lk11 
tliet'l:' was no evidence to sustain plaintiff's perm-
anent disability on or prior to March 31, 1962, de-
frnclants offered to stipulate that plaintiff became 
tlisabled in January, 1961, and that he was entitled 
tc' a pay-ont under the same clause of the contract 
under which the Messina Estate was paid. Plaintiff 
refused to enter into such stipulation. (R. 520 and 
-rJl) ;).;,. . 
The amount which plaintiff would have receiv-
ed if permanent disability had occurred in Janu-
ary, 1961, was computed by defendants and receiv-
ed in evidence as Exhibit D-30. Said Exhibit shows 
the amount of $29,17 4.08 would be owing to Mr. 
Jackson based upon the hypothesis that he became 
permanently disabled in January, 1961. (R. 532 to 
586, inclusive). Said amount of $29,17 4.08 includes 
the money held in trust for Mr. Jackson in the 
amount of $25,755.47, pursuant to the accounting 
heretofore furnished to him by Mr. Caldwell (Ex-
hibit P-15), but it does not take into account the 
loss of an amount in excess of $20,000 in fees with 
respect to those clients who chose to go with and 
be served by Mr. Jackson, Maxwell & Company prior 
to and subsequent to April 1, 1962. (R. 535). Had 
plaintiff timely asserted such disability and not 
competed for the clients, it is reasonable to assume 
that most of the clients who chose to go with Mr. 
Jackson would have remained with defendants. 
Plaintiff failed to assert any disability but solicited 
the clients and eagerly participated in the division 
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of partnership assets on March 31, 1962, to C'()Jt. 
tinue in business with Paul J. Maxwell to sel'vice 
those clients and accounts who chose to go with them 
rather than remain with defendants. 
The computation of the amount due Mr. Jack. 1 
son under the hypothesis that he became permanent. 
ly disabled in January, 1961, as shown in said Ex. 
hibit D-30, also included all of the income of the 
accounts of Mr. Nicholas Rhodes, who was an in-
coming partner to the new firm of Caldwell, Niel-
son, Campbell & Company on April 1, 1962, which 
accounts were merged in that firm ( R. 533), in 
3,ddi ti on to all of the other new business develo1Jerl 
by th new firm between March 31, 1962, and March 
31, 1963, none of which plaintiff was entitled to 
participate in under the partnership agreement. 
As above stated, the computation in said fa. 
hibit D-30 does not take into account the loss of 
something in excess of $20,000 in fees to the ne\\' 
firm by reason of the loss of clients who chose to go 
with Mr. Jackson. In order that the computations 
with respect to these clients could have been proper· 
ly con·elated in said Exhibit D-30 to arrive at ~ 
complete picture of the situation an accounting 
thereof should have been prepared by Mr . .Jackson. 
This, he has refused to do. 
Defendants suggest that by reason of plaintiff 
failing to assert any disability benefits, under ar'.l' 
agreement, on March 31, 1962; that by reason of Ins 
acquiesence in the division of the assets of the old 
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[ti i11 '.11 the time of the termination thereof; that by 
rt'aso11 of his entrring into a business relationship 
\rith Paul J. Maxwell three months prior to March 
31. 10G2, in effect being a member of both partner-
s;11ps at the same time, and soliciting accounts to 
Jw sen'icecl by Mr. Maxwell, and Jackson, Maxwell 
e,, Company subsequent to March 31, 1962; that by 
reason of his complete failure to render an account-
i11g· to Ml'. Caldwell with respect to the accounts who 
chose to go with Jackson, Maxwell & Company, or 
with respect to any of his theories of liability in 
this law suit; that by reason of plaintiff's actions 
being completely inconsistent with any theory of 
liability based upon permanent disability; that by 
re:isnn of there being no realistic evidence that 
plaintif was permanently disabled on March 31, 
1962, 01· at any time prim· thereto; that plaintiff 
h~n effectively abandoned all rights, if any, that 
he had unde1· the Ma1·ch 7, 1960, agreement and 
should be precluded from asserting any rights at 
this junctm·e. 
Acklitionally, and in light of the foregoing, it 
is most difficult to conceive how defendants could 
b~ charged with any liability based upon the amount 
of formula damages provided in Article X of the 
Exhibit P-4, when there is no evidence that Mr . 
.Jackson \Vas permanently disabled on March 31, 
Hl62 and no disability benefit was ever asserted by 
him at any time; he recognized and operated pur-
~uant to the provisions of the 1959 agreement (Ex-
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hibit P-4) right up to March 31, 1962, and received 
all of the benefits to which he was entitled there-
under; prior to March 31, 1962, he was setting up 
with Paul Maxwell in the Judge Building and sub. 
sequent to March 31, 1962, he was busily engageri 
with Paul J. Maxwell in servicing those clients who 
chose to go with him rather than remain with Mr. 
Caldwell and his associates. As late as August, 1962 
I 
he was still busily engaged in pursuing his account-
ing practice in Utah, Idaho, Nevada, and Wyoming, 
as evidenced by an article appearing on page 27 of 
the "Intermountain Industry" magazine received in 
evidence as Exhibit D-48, setting forth the status 
of the situation and representing to the public that 
Jackson, Maxwell & Company had been and still 
was in business. 
Defendants submit that under the facts the 
lower court's holding that none of the parties wel'e 
obligated to account under said agreement of March 
7, 1960, should be affirmed. 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiff seeks equitable relief but has not him· 
self done that which is fair and equitable. He cannot 
claim the defendants did not deal fairly with him. He 
was as anxious and interested in continuing in the 
accounting business on March 31, 1962, as we~·e 
the defendants. Both plaintiff's new partnership 
with Mr. Maxwell and defendants' new partnership 
are completely different from the old partnership. 
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jll of the pal'ties effectively abandoned the old part-
nr,rship entity on March 31, 1962, and neither of 
the new partnerships have any actual privy with 
the old terminated partnership. There was no con-
tinuity of the old partnership entity after March 31, 
1962, and there was no duty upon either plaintiff 
or defendants to preserve the good will, if any, of 
the old partnership. There is nothing in the record 
from which it appears that the plaintiff has been 
precluded from preserving, on his own behalf, any 
ralue in the alleged good will of the old partnership, 
if he desired to do so, purely personal reasons alone 
excepted. That he had full opportunity to do so is 
clear from the record. The situation is not one where 
it can be said that the defendants have converted 
any property consisting of good will to their own 
use so that they would be accountable to plaintiff 
fnr the alleged value thereof. Under the facts and 
~ircumstances of this case, the value of the good 
will. if any, must lie where it falls. 
The work in process allocation as proposed by 
plaintiff will not achieve a fair division thereof 
between the parties. The procedure utilized by Mr. 
Caldwell is the only fair method to arrive at an 
equitable division of this asset. The application of 
percentage factors to totals, as proposed by plain-
tiff, is contrary to accounting principles and most 
certainly should never be considered as a solution 
when the pertinent and necessary information is 
rr~dily available to consumate the division on an 
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individual client-account basis as is set forth in Ex-
hibits P-14 and D-32. 
Defendants never breached the agreement of 
March 7, 1960, or, as a matter of fact, any agree-
ment, and therefore, plaintiff is not entitled to anv 
damages under any theory flowing therefrom. At 
the time of the termination of the old partnership 
on March 31, 1962, plaintiff never asserted that he 
was entitled to any disability benefits of any kind 
or nature and his actions prior to and subsequent 
to March 31, 1962, are completely inconsistent with 
any of his asserted rights for disability benefits 
under the March 7, 1960, agreement. Plaintiff is 
late at this time in asserting disability benefits not 
asserted at the time of the termination of the part-
nership and division of its assets on March 31, 1962. 
Furthermore, the evidence is absolutely clear that 
plaintiff was not permanently disabled on March 31, 
1962, or at any time prior thereto, in order fur 
him to have been entitled to receive any additional 
pay-out after March 31, 1962, by reason of any dis-
ability under the agreement of March 7, 1960. 
This court has consistently held that in this 
type of a case it reviews questions generally in light 
most favorable to findings of the trial court, and 
reverses only if the evidence or lack of it renders 
it clearly necessary to do so. 
A careful review of the record can only learl to 
the conclusion that plaintiff completely failed tn 
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sustain the burden of proof as to any of his causes 
of aetion and the judgment of the lower court as to 
tlw rights of the parties an dthe final consumma-
tion of the old partnership affairs should be af-
firmed in all respects. 
Respectfully submitted, 
EDWARD M. BOWN 
515 Kearns Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
PUGSLEY, HAYES, RAMPTON & 
WATKISS 
315 East 200 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorneys for 
Defendants-Respondents 
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